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RELATIONALLY SPEAKING: THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF TREATING 
EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY IN A 




In July 2018, the Ontario Superior Court, in S.H. v D.H., 
dealt with a dispute between a recently separated couple 
over a frozen embryo that the couple had created. In his 
judgment, Justice Del Frate stated that the embryo should 
be conceived of as property. This was the cause of uproar 
among feminist legal scholars who were concerned with 
the possible repercussions for cisgender women of labeling 
embryos as property. The Superior Court decision was 
subsequently overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
this past May (2019). However, given the likelihood that 
embryos will be treated as property in future disputes, it is 
important to assess what the ramifications of this type of 
categorization might be.  
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Petrie-Flom Center at Harvard University Law School. I would like to 
thank Tina Piper as well as panelists at the Gender and Sexuality Open 
Session of the 2019 Canadian Sociological Association meeting in 
Vancouver for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I 
am grateful for my postdoctoral supervisors Lara Khoury and Alana 
Klein, as well as Stefanie Carsley for her constant mentorship. The 
ideas in this paper benefited enormously from feedback from Timothy 
Lane, Kathleen La Forest, Emily Hammond, Sarah Lane, and two 
anonymous peer reviewers. 
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In this paper, I employ a feminist relational 
analysis in order to analyze the implications that 
categorizing embryos as property might have for three 
relationships involving cisgender women. I identify these 
relationships to be: (1) the relationship between 
cisgendered heterosexual intended parents, (2) the 
relationship between intended mothers, the embryo, and 
society, and (3) the relationship between intended 
parent(s) and an egg donor and/or surrogate. Ultimately, I 
find that categorizing embryos as property adds to an 
alarming power imbalance between cisgendered 
heterosexual intended parents when they are separating 
and trying to make decisions about what to do with frozen 
embryos. Secondly, I argue that there are compelling 
reasons that categorizing embryos as property could 
perpetuate the idea that cisgender women’s bodies are 
ownable, and that egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies are 
commodities. These are views that could have the effect of 
perpetuating the long-term oppression and 
disempowerment of cisgender women. If the trend towards 
treating embryos as property continues to grow, a feminist 
reconceptualization of property, such as that proposed by 
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky would be an important, albeit 
slow, step to alter notions that cisgender women can be 













In July of 2018 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice issued 
a judgment on a dispute over frozen embryos.1 The dispute 
was between forty-eight-year-old D.H. and her former 
husband S.H.2 The couple had purchased donated eggs and 
sperm from a gamete agency in Georgia, United States 
which they then used to create two viable embryos.3 One 
of the resulting embryos was implanted in D.H., who gave 
birth to their son.4 The one remaining embryo was the 
source of conflict in the case. Whilst D.H. sought to use the 
embryo, S.H. wanted the embryo to be donated.5 Neither 
party had a genetic connection with the embryo.6 The 
parties had signed contracts both in Ontario and Georgia 
agreeing that the embryo would be treated as property.7 
The Ontario contract left the decision to D.H. (the patient) 
and said that on separation of the spouses, D.H.’s wishes 
should be respected.8 The Georgia contract left the decision 
to the court.9 Justice Robert Del Frate held that the dispute 
 
1  See SH v DH, 2018 ONSC 4506 [SH ONSC]. 
2  See ibid at paras 1–3, 6, 13.   
3  See ibid at para 4. 
4  See ibid at para 5. 
5  See ibid at paras 1–2. 
6  See ibid at para 4.  
7  See ibid at para 8. 
8  See ibid at para 9. 
9  See ibid at paras 28–29. 
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needed to be decided based on the contracts that the parties 
had signed.10 
  
In his judgment, he wrote that the Georgia contract 
went against contract law by putting the responsibility of 
deciding what to do with the embryo on the court.11 In his 
opinion, the parties knew what they were agreeing to when 
they signed the contract and they could not subsequently 
apply “buyer’s remorse.”12 Ultimately, Justice Del Frate 
followed the Ontario contract, meaning that the embryo 
went to D.H. However, he went on to say that “[i]t is also 
clear that the embryo is property,”13 and since this is a 
division of property, S.H. should be reimbursed his half of 
the value of the embryo—a sum of US$1,438.14  
 
S.H. appealed the decision in May 2019 and the 
Ontario Court of Appeal released a decision written by 
Justice Fairburn, which overturned the Superior Court’s 
decision.15 Justice Fairburn wrote that neither contract, nor 
property law principles governed in this case.16 She found 
that the case should be decided based on the consent-based 
model imposed by Parliament.17 In Canada, the Assisted 
 
10  See ibid at para 25. 
11  See ibid at para 31. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid at para 33.  
14  See ibid at para 34. 
15  See SH v DH, 2019 ONCA 454 [SH ONCA]. 
16  See ibid at para 4.  
17  See ibid at para 5.  
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Human Reproduction Act, 2004 (AHRA)18 and its 
associated Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 
Consent) Regulations (AHRA Regulations)19 govern the 
use, donation and disposal of human embryos.20 Under the 
 
18  Assisted Human Reproduction Act, SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. 
19  Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent) Regulations, 
SOR/2007-137 [AHR Consent Regulations]. 
20  The AHRA came into force in 2004 after many years in the making. 
Members of a royal commission (the “Baird Commission”) had 
assessed Canadians’ opinions on assisted reproductive technologies 
and published a report called Proceed with Care in 1993. See Ottawa, 
Privy Council Office, Proceed with Care - Final Report of the Royal 
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (1993) (Chair: 
Patricia Baird) [Royal Commission on NRTs]. There were then four 
attempts to pass legislation before Bill C-6 became the AHRA. Less 
than two years after the Act came into force, the Quebec government 
challenged the constitutionality of many of its sections on the basis that 
it impinged upon provincial jurisdiction. See Renvoi fait par le 
gouvernement du Québec en vertu de la Loi sur les renvois à la Cour 
d'appel, LRQ, ch R-23, relativement à la constitutionnalité des articles 
8 à 19, 40 à 53, 60, 61 et 68 de la Loi sur la procréation assistée, LC 
2004, ch 2 (Dans l'affaire du), 2008 QCCA 1167. The Quebec Court 
of Appeal concluded that the provisions were ultra vires Parliament. 
The Attorney General of Canada appealed the decision to the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC), which declared many of the provisions of the 
Act unconstitutional. See Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction 
Act, 2010 SCC 61. The sections dealing with the use, donation, and 
disposal of human embryos are among some of the few sections that 
were not repealed. See e.g. Dave Snow, Assisted Reproduction Policy 
in Canada: Framing, Federalism, and Failure (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2018) for commentary on the AHRA. See e.g. Vanessa 
Gruben & Angela Cameron, “Quebec’s Constitutional Challenge to the 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Overlooking Women’s 
Reproductive Autonomy” in Stephanie Paterson, Francesca Scala & 
Marlene K Sokolon, eds, Fertile Ground (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2014) 126 for commentary specifically on the SCC 
case. 
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AHRA, no one can use an embryo without the consent of 
the “donor.”21 The AHRA Regulations explain that a donor 
is the individual, spouse, or common-law partners who the 
embryo was created for.22 When the two people who 
created the embryo were spouses or common-law partners, 
when the embryo was created, both of them have to consent 
to use or donate the embryo, regardless of whether they 
were genetic contributors or not.23 This means that even if 
a couple breaks up, both members need to consent to the 
embryo’s disposition, even if they used donor gametes. 
However, if only one of them is a genetic contributor, and 
the relationship ends before the embryo is used, then the 
person who provided their genetic material gets exclusive 
control over the embryo.24 Disputes arise in cases where 
both members of the couple have provided genetic 
material, or as in the case of S.H. and D.H., where both 
members of the couple did not contribute genetic material, 
and they cannot agree on what to do with the embryo(s).  
 
In Quebec, this issue is expressly dealt with through 
An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Related 
to Assisted Procreation (Act Respecting Assisted 
 
21  AHRA, supra note 18, s 8(3).  
22  See AHR Consent Regulations, supra note 19, s 10(1)(a) and (b). 
23  See ibid, s 10(1)(b), which explains that a donor can be defined as “the 
couple who are spouses or common-law partners at the time the in-
vitro embryo is created, regardless of the source of the human 
reproductive material used to create the embryo”. See also ibid, s 10(2), 
which explains that both members of the couple have to consent.  
24  See ibid, s 10(3), which explains that if the embryo was created from 
the reproductive material of only one member of the couple, and the 
relationship breaks down, then only that individual is considered the 
donor.  
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Procreation)25 and its associated regulations the 
Regulation Respecting Clinical Activities Related to 
Assisted Procreation (Regulation Respecting Assisted 
Procreation).26 The regulations require that parties have to 
agree, before the embryos are created or frozen, about what 
will happen to the embryos should one party withdraw their 
consent.27 No other provinces or territories have put in 
place legislation dealing with what parties should do in the 
event that they do not agree about disposition. Since the 
dispute between S.H. and D.H. took place in Ontario, only 
the AHRA applies. Justice Fairburn ultimately found that 
S.H. was entitled to withdraw his consent to D.H. using the 
embryos, and that the Ontario contract did not take away 
this right.28 
 
Much debate has surrounded what embryos are, 
whether they are “property,” “people,” or something in 
between—a sui generis category for instance.29 Legal 
scholar Stefanie Carsley argues that it is clear from 
 
25  See An Act Respecting Clinical and Research Activities Relating to 
Assisted Procreation, RSQ 2009, c A-5.01 [Act Respecting Assisted 
Procreation] and its associated Regulation Respecting Clinical 
Activities Related to Assisted Procreation, OC 644-2010, 7 July 2010, 
(2010) GOQ II 2253, ss 19–20 [Regulation Respecting Assisted 
Procreation]. 
26  Regulation Respecting Assisted Procreation, supra note 25, s 19. 
27  See ibid, s 21. 
28  See SH ONCA, supra note 15 at para 21.  
29  See Alana Cattapan & Françoise Baylis, “Frozen in Perpetuity: 
‘Abandoned Embryos’ in Canada” (2015) 1:2 Reproductive 
Biomedicine & Society 104 at 109.  
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Canadian law that embryos are not persons.30 Canadian 
case law31 confirms that fetuses are not human beings. The 
definition of an embryo in the AHRA makes it clear that 
embryos are less developed than fetuses.32 Thus, it follows 
that embryos are also not persons.33 The Royal 
Commission Report, “Proceed with Care,” upon which the 
AHRA was based, recommended treating embryos as 
property.34 However, treating embryos like other property 
amounts embryos to something which can be bought and 
sold, and this would be contrary to the AHRA’s prohibition 
on the commercialization of reproductive material.35  
 
Although it was overturned by the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, the Superior Court’s decision in the dispute 
between S.H. and D.H. was the most recent of three 
Canadian cases that demonstrate Canadian courts’ 
willingness to treat reproductive material as property in the 
context of disputes between couples or friends. In 2005, the 
 
30  See Stefanie Carsley, “Rethinking Canadian Legal Responses to 
Frozen Embryo Disputes” (2014) 29:1 Can J Fam L 55 at 83, n 78 
[Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”]; Stefanie Carsley, 
Conceiving a Feminist Legal Approach to Frozen Embryos: Exploring 
the Limitations of Canadian Responses to Disposition Disputes and 
Donor Anonymity (LLM Thesis, University of Toronto, 2013) 
[unpublished] at 40, n 69. 
31  See e.g. Tremblay v Daigle, [1989] 2 SCR 530, 62 DLR (4th) 634 
[Tremblay]; Winnipeg Child and Family Services (Northwest Area) v 
G (DF), [1997] 3 SCR 925, 152 DLR (4th) 193. 
32  See AHRA, supra note 18, s 3 (“embryos”). 
33  See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30. 
34  See Royal Commission on NRTs, supra note 20. 
35  See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30; AHRA, 
supra note 18, s 2(f). 
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Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta dealt with the question 
of whether a woman (C.C.) could have access to embryos 
created through her eggs and the sperm of a friend (A.W.). 
A.W. did not, however, consent to the release of the 
embryos. The court held that the sperm was a gift and that 
the remaining embryos were C.C.’s property. The court 
wrote “they are chattels that can be used as [C.C.] sees 
fit.”36  
 
In another case, J.C.M. v A.N.A., the Supreme Court 
of British Columbia dealt with a dispute between two 
women over thirteen sperm straws that the couple had 
purchased in the United States.37 The court relied on A.W. 
v C.C. and the United Kingdom case of Yearworth v North 
Bristol NHS Trust in which the court had stated that: 
“developments in medical science now require a re-
analysis of the common law’s treatment of and approach to 
the issue of ownership of parts or products of a living 
human body, whether for present purposes (viz. an action 
in negligence) or otherwise.”38 In J.C.M. v A.N.A., Justice 
Russell found that the sperm had been treated as property 
by the donor, the gamete agency, the clinic, and the parties. 
Since the parties had divided all their joint assets when 
their relationship ended, it followed that the sperm straws 
should be divided as well. Given the uneven number, 
J.C.M. got seven, A.N.A. got six, and J.C.M. had to pay 
A.N.A. for the value of the extra sperm straw.  
 
 
36  See CC v AW, 2005 ABQB 290 at para 21.  
37  See JCM v ANA, 2012 BCSC 584 [JCM]. 
38  Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust, [2009] EWCA Civ 37 at para 
45(a).  
332     CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 32, 2019] 
 
 
In other Canadian cases, outside the context of 
disputes between couples or friends, judges have also faced 
the issue of whether reproductive material is property. In 
Lam v British Columbia, Justice Butler of the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia dealt with the issue of whether 
sperm could be categorized as property for the purpose of 
provincial legislation dealing with the storage of goods.39 
Howard Lam was the representative of a class of 400 
cancer patients who had stored sperm in a freezer in an 
andrology lab at the University of British Columbia as a 
preventive measure in case their cancer radiation 
treatments affected their reproductive potential. An 
electrical problem with the freezer resulted in damage to 
the sperm. The patients sued for negligence. Justice Butler 
held that the sperm was in fact property for the purposes of 
the provincial legislation. More recently, in K.L.W. v 
Genesis Fertility Centre Justice Pearlman of the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia dealt with the question of 
whether K.L.W.’s late husband’s sperm was her legal 
property. Even though her husband (A.B.) had not 
consented in writing to K.L.W. using his sperm if he died, 
there was evidence from a number of witnesses that 
suggested that he wanted his wife to be able to use the 
sperm to conceive in the event that he died.40 Justice 
Pearlman held that the sperm was K.L.W.’s legal property. 
In other jurisdictions, like the United States, courts have 
dealt with the issue of what to do with embryos in the 
context of disputes through reliance on a weighing of rights 
 
39  See Lam v University of British Columbia, 2013 BCSC 2094 at para 
68. 
40  See KLW v Genesis Fertility Centre, 2016 BCSC 1621 at para 132. 
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approach in some cases,41 but largely through clinic 
consent forms,42 property law,43 or a combination of the 
latter two approaches.44 
 
Despite the growing trend in Canada, and in other 
jurisdictions, to rely on property law, consent forms, or 
some combination of the two to manage these disputes, the 
Superior Court decision of S.H. v D.H. was the cause of 
much public media debate from Canadian lawyers, 
academics, and the general public.45 The most common 
 
41  See Davis v Davis, 842 SW (2d) 588 (Tenn 1992); In Re Marriage of 
Witten, 672 NW (2d) 768 (Iowa 2003) [Witten]; AZ v BZ, 725 NE (2d) 
1051 (Mass Sup Jud Ct 2000); Human Embryo #4 HB-A v Vergara, 
US Dist LEXIS 136782 (La E Dist Ct, 2017). 
42  See Kass v Kass, 696 NE (2d) 174, 673 NYS (2d) 350, 91 NY (2d) 554 
(App Ct 1998) [Kass]; In Re Marriage of Dahl and Angle, 194 P (3d) 
834, 222 Or App 572 (1998); Roman v Roman, 193 SW (3d) 40 (Tex 
Ct App 2006); Litowitz v Litowitz, 48 P (3d) 261 (Wash Sup Ct 2002); 
JB v MB, 751 A (2d) 613 (NJ Sup Ct 2001) [JB]. 
43  See York v Jones, 717 F Supp 421 (Va Dist Ct 1989]; Witten, supra 
note 41. 
44  See e.g. Kass, supra note 42; JB, supra note 42. 
45  See e.g. Stefanie Carsley, “Who has control over frozen embryos after 
a divorce?”, The Globe and Mail (13 August 2018), online: 
<www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-who-has-control-over-
frozen-embryos-after-divorce/> [Carsley, “Who Has Control”]; 
Gabrielle Giroday, “Judge says Sudbury woman can use embryo after 




fight-with-ex-husband-16035/>; Alana Cattapan, “Who gets the frozen 
embryos in the divorce?”, The Conversation (8 August 2018), online: 
<theconversation.com/who-gets-the-frozen-embryos-in-the-divorce-
101022>. 
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critique of the case, among scholars and lawyers alike, is 
that it categorized embryos as property. Although it was 
overturned, it seems likely, based on recent trends, that this 
conceptualization of embryos as property will arise in other 
disputes. I use this juncture as an opportunity to assess 
whether the concerns over the Superior Court’s decision to 
label embryos as property are warranted.  
 
In this paper I employ a feminist relational analysis 
of autonomy in order to analyze the implications of 
categorizing embryos as property, like Justice Del Frate did 
in S.H. v D.H. In Part I of this paper, I examine the notion 
that property is symbolic of autonomy. I argue that this 
understanding of property is flawed because property has a 
strong relational component. Categorizing something, like 
an embryo, as property has implications for people’s 
relationships with others and with society. We can only 
understand the true effect of categorizing embryos as 
property by looking at what it means for these 
relationships. A feminist relational theory of autonomy 
allows us to examine these implications in consideration of 
the social, cultural, and historical factors that play into 
people’s relationships.    
 
In Part II, I employ a feminist relational theory of 
autonomy to analyze three major relationships that will be 
affected by categorizing embryos as property. I identify 
these to be: (1) the relationship between cisgendered 
heterosexual intended parents, (2) the relationship between 
intended mothers, the embryo, and society, and (3) the 
relationship between intended parent(s) and an egg donor 
                     TREATING EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY                 335            
 
and/or surrogate.46 I focus on relationships involving 
cisgender women.47 I do so because of cisgender women’s 
unique (and large) role in reproduction, given that they 
carry and birth a baby,48 and their role in the process of 
creating an embryo is more time-consuming and invasive 
than that of cisgender men. I additionally focus on 
cisgender women because of the important role that 
 
46  Two other important relationships, that were beyond the scope of this 
article, are: (1) the relationships between intended parents and children, 
and (2) the relationship between egg donors, surrogates, and children 
conceived through donor oocytes and/or carried by a surrogate. I chose 
not to look at these two relationships for two reasons. Firstly, Jennifer 
Nedelsky explored the relationship between intended parents and 
children in her article. See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Property in Potential 
Life? A Relational Approach to Choosing Legal Categories” (1993) 
6:2 Can JL & Jur 343 at 343 [Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”]. 
Secondly, the focus of this paper is on the effects, of categorizing 
embryos as property, for cisgender women. An analysis of the effects 
of categorizing embryos as property on the relationship between 
intended parents, egg donors, surrogates, and children ends up largely 
being about how the categorization affects the child born from the 
embryo, rather than about how it affects cisgender women. 
47  In this paper I refer to cisgender women. I acknowledge that my 
arguments do not apply to/reflect the reality of all cisgender women. 
However, I use this category because it still has significance in our 
world. It denotes a structural position. Power is still clustered around 
and exercised against this category. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
“Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence against Women of Color” (1991) 43:6 Stan L Rev 1241 at 
1297 [Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”]. See also Lena Gunnarsson, 
“A Defence of the Category ‘Women’” (2011) 12:1 Feminist Theory 
23 at 23. 
48  Second-wave feminist writer Shulamith Firestone, for example, argued 
that women’s unique role with regard to reproduction is the basis of 
gender inequality. See Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The 
case for the Feminist Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970). 
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property has played in the oppression of people gendered 
as women.49 
 
Ultimately, I come to the following conclusions 
about the effects, of categorizing embryos as property, on 
the three relationships I identified involving cisgender 
women. First, taking into account how characterizing 
embryos as property will interact with social, cultural, and 
historical contexts, I find that categorizing embryos as 
property adds to an alarming power imbalance between 
cisgendered heterosexual intended parents when they are 
separating and trying to make decisions about what to do 
with frozen embryos. This leads me to concur with an 
argument, put forward by Stefanie Carsley, that 
categorizing embryos as property could increase the 
possibility that embryos will be used as a bargaining tool, 
to cisgender women’s detriment, when couples are 
dividing property.50 In light of these inequalities, between 
cisgender men and cisgender women in the division of 
embryos, embryos should be divided in favour of women. 
Secondly, there are compelling reasons that categorizing 
embryos as property could perpetuate the idea that 
cisgender women’s bodies are ownable. Particularly in the 
context of transnational surrogacy and egg donation, 
categorizing embryos as property could create a domino 
effect whereby egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies, which 
enable the creation of this “property,” are viewed as 
commodities. These are views that could have the effect of 
perpetuating the long-term oppression and 
disempowerment of cisgender women. If the trend towards 
 
49  I discuss this in more detail in Part II of this paper.  
50  Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30.  
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treating embryos as property continues to grow, a feminist 
reconceptualization of property, such as that proposed by 
Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, would be an important, albeit 
slow, step to alter notions that cisgender women can be 
owned or commoditized.51  
 
This paper follows the lead of Professor Susan B. 
Boyd whose work advocates that we question the often 
unquestioned gendered impact of different legal and policy 
choices, and how factors such as race and class intersect 
with this impact.52 It seeks to respond to her call for more 
work that uses a feminist paradigm to reveal ongoing and 
shifting relations of power. 53 This paper is in conversation 
with Jennifer Nedelsky who argued that the best way to 
reflect on our choice of a legal category is to examine how 
that legal category structures relationships.54 Nedelsky 
looked at three American cases where embryos were 
treated by the parties as property, and she explored the 
ramifications of this for “[r]elationships of respect and 
 
51  See Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, “The Body as Property: A Feminist 
Re-vision” in Faye D Ginsburg & Rayna Rapp, eds, Conceiving the 
New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995) 387. 
52  See e.g. Susan B Boyd, Child Custody, Law, and Women’s Work (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
53  In this case, I seek to reveal the way that categorizations of embryos as 
property impacts power relations. See e.g. Susan B Boyd, “Spaces and 
Challenges: Feminism in Legal Academia” (2011) 44:1 UBC L Rev 
205. 
54  See Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”, supra note 46 at 343; 
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, 
Autonomy, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
[Nedelsky, Law’s Relations]. 
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appreciation for children.”55 I build on her work by 
hypothesizing about the implications for three other 
relationships (involving cisgender women) that could be 
affected by categorizing embryos as property.56 
   
PART I: THE RELATIONAL COMPONENT OF 
PROPERTY 
 
Beginning with the oldest theories of property, property 
has been seen as a symbol of autonomy. In Chapter V, 
Essay Two, of “Two Treatises of Government,” John 
Locke explains how initially the world belongs to everyone 
in common. However, every individual is entitled to take 
some of the common property and make it their own 
legitimate private property. They do so by mixing labour—
their own, or that of someone they employed—into land or 
 
55  Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”, supra note 46 at 355. 
56  See ibid at 343, 346–51, 355. In addition to “[r]elationships of respect 
and appreciation of children,” Nedelsky identified two other 
relationships that she thought would be affected by designating 
embryos as property. These are: (1) “[r]elationships of respect for 
women and honouring of their reproductive capacities and labour,” and 
(2) “[r]elations of equality, between people of all classes and 
backgrounds as well as between men and women” (at 355). Nedelsky’s 
second category of relationships reflects my own second category of 
relationships. However, whilst Nedelsky discusses possible concerns 
about exploitation, commodification and alienation of women’s bodies 
(at 346–51), she does not explicitly look at these from a relational 
perspective, which is what I do here. Nedelsky’s third category of 
relationship could encompass the relationship between heterosexual 
couples and the relationships between intended parents and their 
surrogate or egg donor. However, she does not discuss these two types 
of relationships.  
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other natural resources.57 “That labour,” writes Locke, “put 
a distinction between them and common. That added 
something more to them than Nature, the common mother 
of all, had done, and so they became his private right.”58 
Locke justifies the right to possess objects outside one’s 
self through the idea of self-ownership. He writes, “every 
man has a ‘property’ in his own Person. This nobody has 
any right to but himself. The ‘labour’ of his body and the 
‘work’ of his hands we may say, are properly his.”59 Since 
we own our labour, and are mixing this labour to something 
in nature, the result becomes our property. In Locke’s 
theory, people have, or should have, private property 
rights. As private owners, people have the “right to possess, 
the right to use, the right to manage, the right to income of 
the thing, the right to the capital,”60 and so on. Locke is 
suggesting that property comprises a private sphere that 
people have full autonomy over. Legitimate government 
should, as its goal, protect rights, such as this private sphere 
of people’s property rights.61  
 
 
57  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government: Second Treatise, Rod Hay, 
ed (London: Printed for Thomas Tegg; W Sharpe & Son; G Offor; 
Gand J Robinson; J Evans & Co; R. Griffin & Co Glasgow & J 
Gumming, Dublin) at 115, online (pdf): 
<www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/3025pdf/Locke.pdf>. 
58  Ibid at 116.  
59  Ibid.  
60  See AM Honoré, Making Law Bind Essays Legal and Philosophical 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 161 at 370 for a full list.  
61  See Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts 
and Possibilities” (1989) 1 Yale JL & Feminism 7 at 17 [Nedelsky, 
“Reconceiving Autonomy”]. 
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Feminism and Autonomy 
 
This premise that property defines an autonomous sphere, 
however, is problematic because autonomy itself is flawed. 
The concept of autonomy has been critiqued heavily, 
particularly in feminist literature. Critics of autonomy 
argue that while the concept does not need to be thrown out 
completely, it needs immense reconceptualization.  
 
Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar have 
helpfully categorized critiques of historical and 
contemporary conceptions of autonomy into five 
categories.62 The first critique has been led by scholars like 
Lorraine Code. Code’s focus is on the character ideal of the 
“autonomous man”, which she argues has been very 
influential in Western culture.63 This depiction is that of the 
man envisioned by Locke who has his own private space 
within his property and leads a self-sufficient, independent 
life. This ideal is detrimental because it prioritizes 
independence over other values, like caring, friendship and 
responsibility, and treats communities that emphasize these 
values as problematic. It is also a flawed depiction of 
persons because it ignores the fact that people become 
people in relation to others—we are not solely independent 
beings.64 Mackenzie and Stoljar label the second grouping 
 
62  See Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds, Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 5.  
63  Lorraine Code, What Can She Know?: Feminist Theory and the 
Construction of Knowledge (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1991) at 72. 
64  See ibid at 44. 
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of critiques as metaphysical.65 The main argument of these 
metaphysical critiques is that we have developed a theory 
of autonomy on the assumption that people are atomistic 
and individualistic. However, people are not individualistic 
in the way that individualistic has traditionally been 
defined. Rather, people are socially embedded. Thus, our 
conceptualization of autonomy is based on an error. The 
third set of criticisms are care critiques. These relate to 
Lorraine Code’s argument that traditional 
conceptualizations of autonomy have valued independence 
and self-sufficiency over interconnection and dependence. 
Relations of dependence and interconnection, however, are 
central to cisgender women’s lives and are associated with 
cis and heteronormative femininity. Thus, traditional 
conceptions of autonomy that prefer independence and 
self-sufficiency devalue cisgender women’s experiences.66 
Fourth are the criticisms that the authors lump into a 
category called postmodernist critiques. These critics argue 
that ideals of autonomy that assume that people are 
psychically unified and self-aware are false.67 Jean 
Grimshaw, for instance, draws on Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theory to illustrate that people are in fact conflict-ridden.68 
Critics argue that those ideals of autonomy that assume a 
pure Kantian true self or free will ignore the fact that people 
are “constituted within and by regimes, discourses, and 
 
65  See Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 62 at 7.  
66  See ibid at 5. 
67  See ibid at 10.  
68  Jean Grimshaw, “Autonomy and Identity in Feminist Thinking” in 
Morwenna Griffiths & Margaret Whitford, eds, Feminist Perspectives 
in Philosophy (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1988) 90 at 102–03. 
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micropractices of power.”69 There is no one universal 
notion of autonomy. Autonomy is different for different 
people because it is based on people’s different historical, 
social, and cultural contexts. The final critiques are 
diversity critiques. These critics argue that everyone’s 
identities reflect the multiple groups to which they belong 
and the ways that these identities (for example: gender, 
race, class, to name a few) interact.70 These multiple 
dimensions of identity cannot be explained as either/or 
propositions. 
 
For instance, Kimberlé Crenshaw explains that 
when speaking of women of colour, we cannot explain 
their identity as “woman” or “person of colour.”71 
Crenshaw developed the theory of intersectionality in order 
to understand the ways that these grounds of identity 
interact to shape the multiple dimensions of people’s 
experiences in different contexts. Specifically, Crenshaw 
employed intersectionality to look at the ways that multiple 
forms of inequality compound themselves, such as in 
violence against women of colour72 and Black women’s 
employment experiences.73 Theories of autonomy assume 
a sense of integrated self; theories of intersectionality, 
where the self might not be fully integrated, do not fit with 
 
69  See Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 62 at 10.  
70  See Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins”, supra note 47 at 1242.  
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid.  
73  See Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) 1 U Chicago Legal F 
139 at 141–50 [Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection”].  
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such theories of autonomy.74 At the heart of all of these 
critiques is that traditional individual autonomy is 
individualistic, overly simplistic, and inherently cis and 
heteronormatively masculine. It ignores the relational 
component of people’s lives and the fact that people’s 
actions are embedded in their historical, social, and cultural 
contexts.   
 
What this means for property is that when an 
embryo, for instance, is categorized as property, we might 
assume, based on traditional theories of property, that the 
property owner has autonomy over it and acts 
independently in what they do with it. However, because 
people are inextricably bound up in their relationships and 
in their historical, social, and cultural contexts, the ways 
that people control their property is not autonomous and is 
affected by their context and by other people. Secondly, 
because we are not autonomous beings separated from 
society and from our social relationships, getting property 
rights in something creates new relationships and impacts 
our relationships with other people and society. To look at 
this in any other way would be to ignore the importance of 
society and relationships, particularly for cisgender 
women. This way of thinking is also in line with common 
law jurisprudence which views property as a set of 
relationships between people with different bundles of 




74  See Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 62 at 12.  
75  See Denise R Johnson, “Reflections on the Bundle of Rights” (2007) 
32 Vermont L Rev 247 at 247–48.  
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Relational Theory of Autonomy  
 
A relational theory of autonomy helps us understand the 
ways that people, context (social, cultural, and historical), 
and social determinants (race, class, gender and ethnicity) 
are implicated in our relationships with property. A 
relational theory of autonomy is the feminist reconfiguring 
of individual autonomy that adds the relational concept of 
the self. As I mentioned earlier in this paper, Jennifer 
Nedelsky advocated that we should reflect on our choice of 
legal categories through examining how they structure 
relationships.76 Nedelsky was also the first person to 
articulate a feminist account of relational autonomy.77 
Since then, a large number of feminist scholars have 
employed relational theory across different disciplines. 
Each of these authors has worked with and articulated 
relational theory in different ways. The common concern 
of these different authors is to use relational theory to 
uncover how oppression seeps into people’s decisions, 
actions, and relationships with others.  
 
The relational theory that I draw on here finds its 
roots in liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism.78 
“The image of humans as self-determining creatures . . . 
remains one of the most powerful dimensions of liberal 
thought.”79 Relational theory, however, rejects the 
 
76  See Nedelsky, Law’s Relations, supra note 54.  
77  See Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy”, supra note 61. 
78  See Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J Llewellyn, eds, Being Relational: 
Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2011) at 6. 
79  Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Autonomy”, supra note 61 at 8. 
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individualism inherent in the idea that people are self-
determining. It recognizes that people are socially 
embedded, and that people, context, and social 
determinants affect the self.80 This is where relational 
theory draws on communitarianism, which acknowledges 
the way that community relationships mould people’s 
identities and personalities.81 Finally, I draw on feminism 
because of the historic significance of relationships in 
cisgender women’s lives.  
 
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir famously 
argues that women are not seen and defined as themselves, 
but through their relation to others.82 In particular, 
cisgender women are defined and differentiated with 
reference to men.83 Men, on the other hand, can think of 
themselves without women. More recently, Carol Gilligan 
argued that not only are cisgender women’s identities 
formed and sustained through relationships with others, but 
cisgender women’s “moral voices” are also centered on 
relationships and responding to others in caring ways.84 
Thus, the relationships created through characterizing 
embryos as property are likely to be more important to 
cisgender women and their identities, as cisgender women 
 
80  See ibid. 
81  See Downie & Llewellyn, supra note 78 at 8.  
82  See Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated by Constance 
Borde & Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (London: Vintage, 2011) at 6, 
10. 
83  See ibid.  
84  See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women’s Development (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1993) at 62.  
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not only have a unique relationship with reproduction, but 
also have identities in which relationships have always 
played a significant part.  
 
In examining the possible relationships that might 
be implicated by characterizing embryos as property, I 
acknowledge that the ways that this characterization 
implicates these relationships will depend on people, 
context, and social determinants. My use of a relational 
theory of autonomy involves looking at each of these 
relationships within their social, cultural, and historical 
contexts. Like many of the relational theory scholars before 
me, I pay close attention to how the oppression of cisgender 
women plays into these relationships.  
 
PART II: A RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
RELATIONSHIPS IMPLICATED IN 
CATEGORIZING EMBRYOS AS PROPERTY 
 
If we think about how and for whom in vitro embryos are 
created, their intended use, and their special status in 
society, there is a long list of relationships that could be 
affected by categorizing embryos as property. These 
include the relationship between two (or more) intended 
parents who create the embryo, intended parent(s) and 
gamete donors, intended parent(s) and surrogates, intended 
parent(s) and the embryo, intended parent(s) and society, 
the clinic and/or agency and gamete donors, the clinic 
and/or agency and surrogates, etc. In this section, I employ 
a relational theory of autonomy to explore how 
characterizing embryos as property will interact with 
social, cultural and historical contexts and what this will 
mean for the relationships involved. The first relationship 
that I explore is that between cisgendered heterosexual 
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intended parents. The second is the relationship between 
intended mothers and the embryo itself, and the 
implications for intended mothers’ relationship with 
society. The third is a relationship that arises when an egg 
donor or surrogate is used and it is the relationship between 
intended parent(s) and the egg donor and/or surrogate.  
 
The Relationship between Cisgendered Heterosexual 
Intended Parents 
 
I begin by focusing on the relationship between 
cisgendered heterosexual intended parents and how 
characterizing embryos as property could affect their 
relationship in light of social, cultural, and historical 
factors. It is when couples are separating and trying to 
decide what to do with frozen embryos that this 
characterization could have the biggest effect on the 
relationship.  
 
Characterizing embryos as property means that 
embryos can be divided between couples like all other 
property of the relationship. The first way that 
characterizing embryos as property could affect intended 
parents’ relationships is that it could cause disputes 
between couples who are breaking up, where otherwise 
there might not have been a dispute.85 In these disputes, 
embryos might be competed over.86 This is a concern 
because of the long history of power imbalances between 
cisgendered heterosexual women and men when it comes 
to property rights. Historically, English common law rules 
 
85  See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30 at 108. 
86  See ibid. See also Carsley, “Who Has Control”, supra note 45. 
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that were brought to Canada left women with little or no 
rights when it came to property.87 When women were 
married, they lost their separate existence. Their person and 
any property, including wages, were absorbed by their 
husbands.88 Although married women did not lose 
ownership of their real estate, they lost the right to manage 
and receive profits from it to their husbands.89 They were 
also “incapable of contracting, of suing, or of being sued in 
their own names.”90 Husbands thus had control over 
women’s lives through managing their property, money, 
 
87  See Constance B Backhouse, “Married Women’s Property Law in 
Nineteenth-Century Canada” (1988) 6:2 L & Hist Rev 211 at 211–12. 
88  See ibid at 243, n 6. This vesting of self and property to the husband 
was part of the doctrine of marital unity. Backhouse notes that there do 
seem to be some exceptions (e.g. with personal claims and debts) 
where property was not vested absolutely in the husband until he 
reduced this property into his own possession. The common law rules 
through which women lost their property have also been described by 
many authors. See e.g. Lee Holcombe, Wives & Property: Reform of 
the Married Women’s Property Law in Nineteenth-Century England 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); Clara Brett Martin, 
“Legal Status of Women in the Provinces of the Dominion of Canada 
(Except the Province of Quebec)” in Women of Canada: Their Life and 
Work (National Council of Women of Canada, 1900) 34. See also 
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four 
Books (1753); Frederick Pollock & Frederick William Maitland, 
“Chapter VII: Family Law” in The History of English Law before the 
Time of Edward I, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1898); Norma Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and 
Property in Nineteenth-Century New York (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1982); Dorothy M Stetson, A Woman’s Issue: The 
Politics of Family Law Reform in England (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1982). 
89  See Backhouse, supra note 87 at 213.  
90  Ibid.  
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and rights. Canadian legislation with regard to women’s 
property rights has since been reformed. However, 
imbalances with regard to property rights remain a problem 
in many jurisdictions around the world.91 These imbalances 
in power, when it comes to property rights, have a social 
element just as much as a legal element. While the laws in 
Canada have changed, this does not mean that the socio-
culture of imbalance, when it comes to property rights, 
have disappeared. A socio-culture of imbalance might still 
permeate heterosexual couples’ disputes over property.  
 
Property law has also been used to marginalize 
groups of people on the basis of race, ethnicity, and class. 
Racialized people have not only been denied property 
rights, but have been treated as property throughout 
history. Cheryl Harris argues that “[t]he origins of property 
rights in the United States are rooted in racial 
domination.”92 Harris is among a number of scholars who 
have written on how the concepts of race and property have 
been used to subordinate certain groups of people on the 
basis of race.93 Writing from the American context, Patricia 
 
91  See e.g. Taiwo Ajala, “Gender Discrimination in Land Ownership and 
the Alleviation of Women’s Poverty in Nigeria: A Call for New 
Equities” (2017) 17:1 Intl J Discrimination & Law 51; L Fonjong, 
Lawrence Fombe & Irene Sama-Lang, “The Paradox of Gender 
Discrimination in Land Ownership and Women’s Contribution to 
Poverty Reduction in Anglophone Cameroon” (2013) 78:3 GeoJournal 
575; Prem Chowdhry, ed, Gender Discrimination in Land Ownership 
(New Delhi: SAGE, 2009).  
92  Cheryl Harris, “Whiteness as Property” (1993) 106:8 Harv L Rev 1707 
at 1716. 
93  See e.g. Ronald Takaki, A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural 
America (Boston: Little Brown Company, 1993); Robert A Williams, 
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J. Williams draws a link between the perspective of a wild 
fox (in Pierson v Post) being pursued by a hunter and his 
hounds, and the experience of her great-great grandmother, 
who was a slave owned by a man named Austin Miller.94 
The similarity between her great-great grandmother and 
the fox was that they were both a form of property—“either 
owned or unowned, never the owner.”95 In either situation, 
the subjects were never given the rights to themselves.96 In 
the Canadian context, historian Barrington Walker 
describes how property law was integral in maintaining the 
system of slavery in Canada, and is still used to maintain 
social inequality today.97 Even where the law has 
improved, as with the area of gender, the social elements 
of these imbalances persist. Thus, race, ethnicity, and class 
also play into power imbalances experienced by cisgender 
women in property disputes, making it such that these 
 
The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of 
Conquest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also Kathleen 
Jamieson, Indian Women and the Law in Canada: Citizens Minus 
(Ottawa: Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1978); 
Margalynne Armstrong, “African Americans and Property Ownership: 
Creating our Own Meanings, Redefining our Relationships” (1994) 1 
African-American Law & Policy Report 79. 
94  See Patricia J Williams, “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals 
from Deconstructed Rights” (1987) 22:2 Harv CR-CL L Rev 401. 
95  Ibid at 420. 
96  Ibid at 421. 
97  See Barrington Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey: 
Historical Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012) at 3. 
See also Barrington Walker, “You Shall Have the Body: Slavery, 
Property Rights and Resistance in Canada” (Labour Law and 
Development Research Laboratory Speaker Series delivered at the 
Faculty of Law, McGill University, 12 September 2017) 
[unpublished]. 
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imbalances might be especially pronounced for racialized 
women. 
  
The power imbalance between cisgender women 
and men is exacerbated by a number of factors that make 
embryos possibly more valuable to cisgender women than 
to cisgender men. Firstly, as Stefanie Carsley, Christine 
Overall, Roxanne Mytiuk, and Albert Wallrap point out, 
cisgender women play a much larger biological role in 
creating embryos than men.98 Men’s contribution to 
creating an in vitro embryo involves ejaculating into a cup. 
The process is relatively easy and straightforward. For 
cisgender women, on the other hand, the process is 
invasive, time-consuming, and can be quite painful. It 
involves drug regimes, surgery, and anesthesia.99 The 
process entails side effects that range from nausea and 
bloating to ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome.100 In the 
long-term, stimulation may cause or accelerate certain 
types of cancer, such as breast and ovarian cancer,101 and 
might pose risks to future fertility, although there are a lot 
 
98  See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30; Roxanne 
Mykitiuk & Albert Wallrap, “Regulating Reproductive Technologies 
in Canada” in Jocelyn Grant Downie, Timothy A Caulfield & Colleen 
M Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
Butterworths, 2002) 367.  
99  See “The Medical Procedure of Egg Donation” (5 June 2002), online: 
Egg Donor Information Project <web.stanford.edu/class/siw198q/ 
websites/eggdonor/procedures.html>. 
100  See ibid. OHSS appears in 1–10 percent of donors. Symptoms include: 
chest and abdominal fluid, and cystic enlargement of the ovaries. It can 
cause permanent injury and death.  
101  See Helen Pearson, “Health Effects of Egg Donation May Take 
Decades to Emerge” (2006) 442 Nature 607. 
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of uncertainties because of a lack of long-term risk 
assessment.102 Second, cisgender women’s fertility seems 
to decline more rapidly than men’s fertility, meaning there 
is a greater likelihood that cisgender women’s eggs will 
become unviable at an earlier age than men’s sperm.103  
 
There are also risks associated with retrieving eggs 
at a later stage. While these issues are not applicable in the 
case of neither member of the couple being a genetic 
contributor, there are risks for cisgender women of 
delaying child-bearing.104 Thirdly, in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) is a costly process. Only Ontario offers public 
funding for IVF; however, there is a limited amount 
offered, and it is not offered to women above the age of 
forty-two. Cisgender women, more often than cisgender 
men, do not work outside the home. When cisgender 
 
102  See Mark V Sauer & Suzanne M Kavic, “Oocyte and Embryo 
Donation 2006: Reviewing Two Decades of Innovation and 
Controversy” (2006) 12:2 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 153 at 
153–54. 
103  See Tracey Bushnik et al, “Estimating the Prevalence of Infertility in 
Canada” (2012) 27:3 Hum Reprod 738 at 742, who find that infertility 
is associated with the age of the female partner. See also Isiah D Harris 
et al, “Fertility and the Aging Male” (2011) 13:4 Rev Urol 184 at 185, 
who indicate that from a physiological perspective it is logical that age 
would have a greater impact on female fertility than male fertility, due 
to the fact that women have a finite number of eggs which declines 
over time, whereas males can continue to produce sperm. However, 
Harris et al. observe (at 188) that aging does have a significant impact 
on male fertility and that there are many unknowns about the extent of 
this impact. It might be more significant than we think.  
104  See Mary Anne Biro et al, “Advanced maternal age and obstetric 
morbidity for women giving birth in Victoria, Australia: A population-
based study” (2012) 52:3 Australian and New Zealand J Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology 229 at 230–31.  
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women do work outside the home they are paid lower 
salaries.105 The cost of paying for IVF again, and possibly 
paying for semen donation, is high. As such, IVF might be 
less accessible to women than it is for men. Fourthly, 
scholars such as Kristin Park have documented the stigma 
experienced by individuals who choose not to have 
children.106 There is an expectation of cisgender women, 
more so than of cisgender men, to become parents. 
 
 As Rosemary Gillespie observes, “constructions of 
[cis and heteronormative] femininity and women’s social 
role have historically and traditionally been contextualized 
around the practices and symbolism surrounding 
motherhood.”107 Motherhood is seen as “natural” and 
expected for cisgender women, and central to cis and 
heteronormative femininity.108 Gillespie argues that she is 
hopeful that discourses are starting to shift such that cis and 
heteronormative femininity is no longer conflated with 
motherhood. However, pronatalist discourses and 
 
105  See Melissa Moyser, “Women and Paid Work” in Women in Canada: 
A Gender-based Statistical Report (Statistics Canada, 2017). 
106  See Kristin Park, “Stigma Management among the Voluntarily 
Childless” (2002) 45:1 Sociological Perspectives 21. 
107  Rosemary Gillespie, “When No Means No: Disbelief, Disregard and 
Deviance as Discourses of Voluntary Childlessness” (2000) 23:2 
Women’s Studies International Forum 223 at 223.   
108  See ibid. See also Evelyn Nakano Glenn, “Social Constructions of 
Mothering: A Thematic Overview” in Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Grace 
Chang & Linda Rennie Forcey, eds, Mothering: Ideology, Experience, 
and Agency (New York: Routledge, 1994) 1; Nancy Felipe Russo, 
“The Motherhood Mandate” (1976) 32:3 J Social Issues 143; Erik H 
Erikson, “Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on Womanhood” (1964) 
93:2 Daedalus 582. 
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discourses that denigrate voluntarily childless cisgender 
women do still persist. Thus, cisgender women may feel as 
though they have to have children and may worry about 
experiencing stigma if they do not. This might make the 
embryos more valuable to cisgender women if they think 
the embryos might be their only chance at motherhood. 
Stefanie Carsley points out that across the case law in 
various jurisdictions, it is generally women who are 
seeking to use the embryos. There is only one example of 
a case where a woman withdrew her consent.109 Carsley’s 
article was written prior the S.H. v D.H. case, but of course 
S.H. v D.H. joins the list of cases whereby the woman 
partner wished to use the embryo and her male partner 
withdrew consent. This suggests that cisgender women 
might want the embryos more badly than men.  
 
This leads to the second problem, which is that 
given these power imbalances and the fact that embryos are 
possibly more valuable to cisgender women than cisgender 
men, embryos might be used as a bartering tool.110 
Cisgender women might have to exchange more of other 
property in exchange for the embryos.  
 
It is of course possible that treating embryos as 
property might not lead to more disputes, and that embryos 
might be split equally between the parties. However, the 
history of power imbalances between cisgender men and 
cisgender women indicates otherwise. This might be 
particularly true for racialized cisgender women. In this 
situation—one in which cisgender women’s bigger 
 
109  Carlsey, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30 at 90. Carsley 
is referencing In Re Marriage of Nash, 150 Wash App 1029 (2009). 
110  See ibid at 108. 
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physical contribution to creating embryos, faster fertility 
decline, possible inability to pay for more IVF, and societal 
expectations that cisgender women have children come 
into play—it seems likely that embryos could become a 
bargaining chip.111 Cisgender women could be taken 
advantage of. As Michelle Sublett suggests, if embryos are 
treated as property, the court or legislature need to develop 
some sort of guidelines for distribution.112 Perhaps these 
guidelines might need to be that embryos are considered to 
be a special form of property that always needs to be split 
equally, as in the sperm straws of J.C.M. v A.N.A. 
Alternatively, embryos should perhaps be split in favour of 
cisgender women.  
 
The Relationship Between Intended Mothers, the 
Embryo, and Society  
 
The second relationship that I investigate is the relationship 
between intended mothers and the embryo itself, if the 
embryo is considered as property. Much of this section, 
however, focuses on what categorizing embryos as 
property could mean for intended mothers’ relationship 
with society, and how intended mothers might be viewed 
by society.  
 
From a relational viewpoint, it is possible that 
treating embryos as property could be beneficial for 
intended mothers’ relationship with embryos, and 
relationship with society. As I stated earlier, it is clear from 
 
111  See ibid.  
112  See Michelle F Sublett, “Frozen Embryos: What are They and How 
Should the Law Treat Them?” (1990) 38:4 Clev St L Rev 585 at 597. 
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Canadian law that embryos are not human beings in 
Canada since they are less developed than fetuses, which 
Canadian case law has confirmed are not persons.113 
Treating embryos as people would not only not be in sync 
with Canada’s emphasis on cisgender women’s procreative 
liberty, but could also jeopardize it.114 In fact, a number of 
scholars115 argue that it is even harmful to cisgender 
women, and their rights, to place too much concentration 
on respect for the embryo in guidelines and statutes on 
embryo research, storage, donation, etcetera.116 The 
embryo is created through an invasive and large 
contribution by cisgender women, and as Isabel Karpin 
points out “the embryo is only connected with its potential 
 
113  See AHRA, supra note 18, s 3  
114  See Tremblay, supra note 31. 
115  See Maneesha Deckha, “Legislating Respect: A Pro-Choice Feminist 
Analysis of Embryo Research Restrictions in Canada” (2012) 58:1 
McGill LJ 199 [Deckha, “Legislating Respect”]; Jenni Millbank, 
“Reflecting the ‘Human Nature’ of IVF Embryos: Disappearing 
Women in Ethics, Law, and Fertility Practice” (2016) 4:1 J Law & 
Biosciences 70; Donna L Dickenson, “Disappearing Women, 
Vanishing Ladies and Property in Embryos” (2017) 4:1 J Law & 
Biosciences 175 [Dickenson, “Disappearing Women”]. 
116  In Canada, all research with embryos is carefully regulated by the 
Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics Government of 
Canada. See the Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics 
Government of Canada (5 February 2016), online: 
<www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/eng/tcps2-eptc2_chapter12-chapitre12.html>. 
Per the AHRA, supra note 18, s 5(1)(b), in vitro embryos cannot be 
created for any reason other than to create a human and provide 
instruction. They cannot even be created for research. Although the 
words “respect” for embryos are not included in either document, it is 
very much implied.  
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for personhood by female embodiment.”117 When we argue 
that all embryos are of equal value, we ignore the important 
role of cisgender women in creating these embryos and 
also the fact that cisgender women are necessary for these 
embryos to become human. Jenni Millbank, whose focus is 
on embryo disposition laws in Australia, argues that the 
special status accorded to embryos created through the IVF 
process means that the cisgender women who create these 
embryos “disappear” or become an afterthought, even 
though it is their desire for children and their labor that 
create the embryos to begin with.118  
 
In the Canadian context, Maneesha Deckha 
investigates whether the “respect” and “dignity” accorded 
to embryos by the AHRA risks jeopardizing support for 
abortion.119 Ultimately she finds that it is possible for 
feminists to promote respect and dignity of embryos while 
still maintaining a pro-choice stance. However, Deckha 
argues that there is a real concern that among the general 
public the AHRA will promote rhetoric of “respect” and 
“dignity” for embryos.120 The public might not look into 
the AHRA in enough detail to see that it was developed in 
such a way so that people can abide by the AHRA and 
respect embryos, and also respect cisgender women’s 
procreative choice at the same time. Deckha’s argument 
confirms Millbank’s suggestion that when laws emphasize 
 
117  Isabel Karpin, “The Uncanny Embryos: Legal Limits to the Human 
and Reproduction Without Women” (2006) 28:4 Sydney L Rev 599 at 
603. 
118  See Millbank, supra note 115.  
119  See Deckha, “Legislating Respect”, supra note 115.  
120  See ibid. 
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the respect and dignity of embryos, this can take the 
limelight and cisgender women are overlooked. For 
Deckha this means cisgender women’s procreative liberty 
is overlooked, whereas for Millbank and Karpin this means 
that cisgender women’s labor in creating and carrying 
embryos is overlooked.  
 
Donna Dickenson takes this a step further. She 
argues that not only does cisgender women’s reproductive 
labor get overlooked, but that cisgender women’s 
reproductive labor has never been considered real labor 
that would entitle cisgender women to ownership rights in 
the products of their labor.121 This, Dickenson argues, is 
consistent with most of cisgender women’s labor, which 
has rarely been recognized as labor and has never given 
cisgender women the same rights that, in liberal theory, it 
would give to men.122 Dickenson suggests that since 
property comes from the labor of cisgender women’s 
bodies, the labor that cisgender women put into the process 
of creating an embryo through IVF qualifies as labor in a 
Lockean sense and should entitle cisgender women to 
property rights in embryos.123 Treating embryos as 
property would be a way to finally recognize cisgender 
women’s reproductive labor as legitimate labor and to 
recognize cisgender women’s right to ownership over the 
 
121  See Dickenson, “Disappearing Women”, supra note 115. 
122  See Donna L Dickenson, “Property and Women’s Alienation from 
their Own Reproductive Labour” (2001) 15:3 Bioethics 205 at 206 
[Dickenson, “Property and Women’s Alienation”]. In liberal theory, 
labour gives men property rights in the products of their labour.   
123  See ibid at 215. 
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products of this labor.124 Dickenson is careful to point out 
that treating embryos as property would not mean that 
cisgender women own their bodies, but only that cisgender 
women own the objects resulting from their labor. 
Dickenson argues that maintaining this distinction ensures 
that we avoid objectification or commodification of 
cisgender women’s bodies.125  
 
Although recognizing embryos as property could 
possibly mean that cisgender women’s role in creating 
embryos is not overlooked and their labor is finally 
recognized as such, a further relational analysis reveals that 
the categorization of embryos as property can have a 
possible detrimental impact on cisgender women’s 
relationship with embryos and society. First, the property 
rights that these scholars anticipate cisgender women 
getting in embryos are based on Locke’s theory. I have 
already pointed out that this theory is flawed. The 
autonomous control that these scholars anticipate that 
cisgender women might get over embryos, if they are 
characterized as property, does not reflect reality.  
 
Second, treating embryos as property implies that 
we have these property rights because we own the labor 
that created them. Traditionally, we own our labor because 
we own our bodies that performed this labor. Farida Akhter 
argues that “[a] woman is naturally in command over her 
body. She is by nature in possession of herself.”126 When 
 
124  See Dickenson, “Disappearing Women”, supra note 115 at 176. 
125  See ibid. 
126  Farida Akhter, On the Question of the Reproductive Right: A Personal 
Reflection (Book published for the FINRRAGE – UBINIG 
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cisgender women think of themselves as owners of their 
bodies, cisgender women are creating a “new social 
relationship” to this natural power.127 This is a social 
relationship which denies that cisgender women’s 
reproductive capacity is a natural power. It turns cisgender 
women’s bodies into a reproductive factory and objectifies 
them. In The Sexual Contract, Carole Pateman argues that 
thinking of ourselves as owners of our bodies overlooks the 
fact that ourselves are inextricably linked to our bodies.128 
In saying that we own our labor, and thus our bodies, we 
are conceptualizing these as distinct from our “self”, when 
in actuality cisgender women’s body and reproductive 
labor are part of their “self”.129  
 
Suggesting that cisgender women have ownership 
in their bodies has also been contested by radical feminists. 
This rhetoric of “control” and “property” when it comes to 
cisgender women’s bodies evokes a history of patriarchal 
practices of objectifying and gaining access to cisgender 
women’s bodies, for instance through medical science and 
population-control agencies.130 Farida Akhter argues that 
we live in a society based on private property where 
 
International Conference hosted in Bard, Kotbari, Comilla, 1989) at 
10, online (pdf): FINNRAGE <www.finrrage.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Comilla_Proceedings_1989.pdf> [Akhter, 
Question of Reproductive]. 
127  Farida Akhter, Issues of Women’s Health and Reproductive Rights 
(Manila, Philippines, 1990) at 8 [Akhter, Women’s Health]. 
128  See Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988) at 215.  
129  Ibid. 
130  See ibid at 388. 
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cisgender women are owned by men as a means of 
production of the human species.131 Carole Pateman argues 
that the means through which “patriarchy is constituted” is 
through the contracts of property that people hold in 
themselves.132 In the classic texts (other than Hobbes), 
however, only men have the necessary characteristics to 
enter into contracts, and so cisgender women are never 
parties to the contract and are only ever the subject. The 
sexual contract is the way in which men use their natural 
right over cisgender women and secure “patriarchal civil 
right.”133 These contracts lead to the exploitation of 
cisgender women, because in such a contract one person is 
subordinate to the other. Pateman argues that when 
cisgender women speak of bodily ownership they implicate 
themselves in “masculine contractarian fictions,” meaning 
that they reinforce the idea that bodies, and especially 
cisgender women’s bodies, are ownable.134 By virtue of 
being able to be owned, cisgender women’s bodies are 
reduced to commodities. Commoditizing cisgender 
women’s bodies brings about its own set of concerns, 
which I address in further detail in the next section when 
talking about the effect of categorizing embryos as 
property on intended parents’ relationships with egg 
donors and surrogates.  
 
Thus, a relational analysis of the implications of 
characterizing embryos as property on intended mothers’ 
relationship with the embryo and society, reveals that it is 
 
131  See Akhter, Question of Reproductive, supra note 126. 
132  Pateman, supra note 128 at 2. 
133  Ibid. 
134  Ibid. 
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possible for characterizing embryos as property to mean 
that we no longer overlook cisgender women’s role in 
creating and carrying embryos, and that cisgender 
women’s reproductive labor is seen as real labor. However, 
social, historical, and cultural context point strongly 
towards the idea that cisgender women would not get the 
property rights in embryos that they anticipate. 
Importantly, cisgender women having a property right in 
embryos implies that cisgender women own their labor, 
and they own their labor because they own their bodies. 
Notions of self-ownership intrude on cisgender women’s 
natural command over their body, implicate cisgender 
women’s selves in ownership, and open the door to the idea 
that cisgender women’s bodies are ownable. The biggest 
concern is the latter. The link between characterizing 
embryos as property and this idea that cisgender women’s 
bodies are ownable might be tenuous. However, it is still 
plausible and would be highly oppressive.  
 
Cisgender women owning their labor, however, 
does not have to bring us back to histories of men owning 
cisgender women. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky argues that 
we need to “recuperate the notion of self-propriety as an 
indispensable part of feminist conceptions of social 
democracy and even property more generally.”135 Our 
understanding of what it means to have self-ownership 
comes down to how we understand property in general. All 
too often, property, ownership, and self-ownership are 
interpreted in historical paradigms of property—most 
commonly a Lockean paradigm. There are two major 
problems with that. Firstly, a Lockean paradigm of 
property draws a sharp distinction between the body as a 
 
135  Petchesky, supra note 51 at 387. 
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commodity, and the person as a transactor.136 It does not 
consider that there may not be a definite dualism between 
the two things. Since Locke’s theory of property is based 
on an individualist conception of social life, it does not 
reveal the relationships involved in self-ownership. It also 
sees self-ownership as purely instrumental towards owning 
the products labored by people’s body. Second, viewing 
self-ownership through a Lockean viewpoint has the effect 
of putting property into economic terms and getting rid of 
any cultural variation in property.  
 
It is easy to get caught up in thinking that there is 
only one idea of property, and that it needs to be economic. 
As a relational view of property reveals, property itself is a 
product of different social, cultural, and historical 
circumstances and thus can vary in different contexts.137 
We can see examples in history where ideas about owning 
one’s body have less to do with property in an economic 
sense and more to do with protecting one’s own sexuality 
and personal security from arbitrary invasion. Petchesky 
uses the example of Marilyn Strathern’s ethnographic 
study of property relations among New Guinea 
Highlanders.138 Strathern found that the New Guinea 
Highland groups did not have the same notions of rights 
over things, or even people, as in Western notions of 
property. Among the Highlanders, ownership is a 
 
136  See ibid at 388. 
137  See CB Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, reprint edition (Ontario: Oxford 
University Press, 2010). 
138  See Marilyn Strathern, “Subject or Object?” in Renee Hirschon, ed, 
Women and Property, Women as Property (London: Croom Helm, 
1984). 
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collective authority over resources and involves 
relationships of caretaking.139 
 
Donna Dickenson said that cisgender women’s 
labor has never really fit into a Lockean perspective of 
property.140 This is perhaps because as Petchesky suggests, 
we need a rethinking of property altogether, that would be 
more appropriate in the context of embryos. This would 
involve creating a radical conception of property and 
creating a feminist idea of bodily integrity.141 In order to 
develop this, Petchesky argues that we can look at the 
different approach to concepts like autonomy and self-
ownership that have been taken for instance by feminists 
of color in the United States. A new underlying theory of 
property would mean a different understanding of self-
ownership that might not have the same ramifications that 
self-ownership has when viewed through a Lockean lens. 
Given how common it is becoming to refer to embryos as 
property, this might be a necessary way to ensure that we 
rethink self-ownership.  
 
The Relationship between Intended Parents, Egg 
Donors, and Surrogates 
 
In this third section, I pick up on some of the concerns 
about intended mothers’ relationship with the embryo and 
with society if we categorize embryos as property. I 
explore how these concerns come into play when an egg 
donor’s genetic material is used to create the embryo, and 
 
139  See ibid. 
140  See Dickenson, “Disappearing Women”, supra note 115. 
141  See Petchesky, supra note 51 at 389. 
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when a surrogate carries the embryo. I look generally at 
what the characterization of embryos as property means for 
the relationship between intended parents and egg donors, 
and the relationship between intended parents and 
surrogates.  
 
As I mentioned in the last section, authors like 
Donna Dickenson argue that treating embryos as property 
could be a way to recognize cisgender women’s 
reproductive labour.142 In the case of egg donors, this could 
be a way to recognize their labour in producing eggs to 
create the embryo. It might also call attention to the labour 
performed by surrogates by saying that embryos are only 
property until female embodiment enables them to become 
persons.143 However, egg donors and surrogates do not get 
the property rights that come with this labour. Egg donors 
provide the eggs for embryos that become intended 
parents’ property. Surrogates also do not own the efforts of 
their labour. Since their labour produces a child, no one 
owns the property rights since children are not ownable. 
Intended parents, however, gain parental rights as a result 
of surrogates’ labour.  
 
In the context of disputes over reproductive 
material, the focus is on the labour of the people whose 
desire for a child created this embryo. For instance, in C.C. 
v A.W. the court justifies that the sperm was a gift to C.C. 
not only because A.W. knew what the sperm would be used 
for, but also because C.C. badly wanted a baby, and put in 
many years of labour trying to conceive with the sperm, 
 
142  See Dickenson, “Disappearing Women”, supra note 115. 
143  Karpin, supra note 117. 
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and had also paid to store the sperm.144 In J.C.M. v A.N.A., 
the sperm straws were the property of J.C.M. and A.N.A. 
because they had chosen them and paid for them in their 
efforts to have children.145 Research on surrogates and egg 
donors indicates that this is the outcome that both groups 
want: egg donors donate their eggs to help intended parents 
produce an embryo and have children, and surrogates carry 
an embryo so that intended parents can have children.146 
Intended parents’ labour in seeking out gamete donors and 
surrogates, paying for these services, and other efforts 
entitle them to rights in the embryos and children.  
 
The concern that this raises, however, is that if egg 
donors and surrogates do not get rights in embryos and 
children produced as products of their labour, who will be 
perceived as owning their labour should embryos be 
characterized as property? At best, egg donors and 
surrogates own the labour themselves, which raises the 
concern around self-ownership that I highlighted in the last 
section. The larger concern is that egg donors’ and 
surrogates’ labour will be seen to be owned by the intended 
parents for whom they perform the labour. Generally, this 
supports the idea that not only can cisgender women’s 
bodies be owned, but also that they can be owned by people 
other than themselves.  
 
 
144  See CC v AW, supra note 36 at paras 20–21. 
145  See JCM, supra note 37. 
146  See Rene Almeling, Sex Cells: The Medical Market for Eggs and 
Sperm (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); Helena 
Ragone, Surrogate Motherhood: Conception in the Heart (Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1994). 
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Secondly, Carole Pateman and Jennifer Nedelsky 
argue that owning the body reduces it to a commodity that 
can be sold in the marketplace.147 For Carole Pateman it 
does not matter whether egg donors and surrogates own 
their body or intended parents own it. The mere fact of 
owning it reduces it to a commodity.148 For intended 
mothers, who use their own eggs and carry the child 
themselves, it is problematic to create an image that their 
bodies can be commodities. However, the reason I discuss 
this commodification in this section on egg donors and 
surrogates is that intended mothers are creating eggs and 
carrying embryos for themselves so they are less likely to 
perpetuate an idea that their bodies are commodities. Egg 
donors and surrogates, on the other hand, perform this 
work for intended parents and this labour is often bought 
and sold. The idea that egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies 
might be commoditized was a preoccupation of the Baird 
Commission149—the Canadian body of commissioners 
who were mandated to study and report on the broad 
“social, ethical, health, research, legal and economic 
implications” of assisted reproductive technologies 
(including third party reproduction, like surrogacy and egg 
donation).150 This was later manifested in the AHRA, which 
in addition to dealing with embryos, also regulates egg 
 
147  See Pateman, supra note 128; Nedelsky, “Property in Potential Life”, 
supra note 46. 
148  See Pateman, supra note 128. 
149  See e.g. Royal Commission on NRTs, supra note 20, vol 2 at xxxii, 13, 
22, 52; Alana Cattapan, “Rhetoric and Reality: ‘Protecting’ Women in 
Canadian Public Policy on Assisted Human Reproduction” (2013) 25:2 
CJWL 202. 
150   Cattapan, supra note 149 at 203. 
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donation and surrogacy. The AHRA prohibits paying for 
surrogacy, gamete, and embryo donation151 in order to 
prevent “trade in the reproductive capabilities of women 
and men and the exploitation of children, women and 
men.”152 However, we know that despite the legislation, 
Canadians are paying for surrogacy and gametes in Canada 
on a grey market, or they are going abroad.153 The fact that 
many surrogates and egg donors are being paid in Canada 
escalates this idea that if egg donors’ and surrogates’ 
bodies can be owned, they become commodities.  
 
The first concern with egg donors’ and surrogates’ 
bodies being treated as commodities is that egg donors and 
surrogates may become reduced to what they, or their 
reproductive labour, can be exchanged for on the market. 
Jyotsna Gupta, Annemiek Richters, Janice Raymond, and 
Vandana Shiva argue that cisgender women become 
 
151  See AHRA, supra note 18. 
152  See ibid, ss 2(f), 6, 7.  
153  See Alison Motluk, “The Human Egg Trade: How Canada’s Fertility 
Laws are Failing Donors, Doctors, and Parents”, The Walrus (12 April 
2010), online: <thewalrus.ca/the-human-egg-trade/>; Kathleen 
Hammond, What Money Can Buy: Tracing Egg Transactions in 
Canada (Doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, 2016) 
[unpublished] for scholarship and media reports on donors and 
surrogates being paid in Canada. See Eric Blyth, “Fertility patients’ 
experiences of cross-border reproductive care” (2010) 94:1 Fertil Steril 
11; Edward Hughes & Deirdre DeJean, “Cross-border fertility services 
in North America: A survey of Canadian and American providers” 
(2010) 94:1 Fertil Steril 16; Nicky Hudson et al, “Cross-border 
reproductive care: a review of the literature” (2011) 22:7 Reproductive 
Biomedicine Online 673; Vincent Couture et al, “Reproductive 
outsourcing: an empirical ethics account of cross-border reproductive 
care in Canada” (2018) 45:1 J Med Ethics 41 for scholarship on going 
abroad. 
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viewed solely as child-bearing machines or breeders.154 
They become viewed as a means to an end rather than being 
valued for their own intrinsic worth as human beings.155  
Reducing cisgender women in this way further legitimizes 
and enforces cisgender women’s gender oppression. 
Treating cisgender women as commodities carries 
connotations of chattel slavery,156 and trafficking in 
persons. These examples have shown us the profound 
moral reasons, like protecting human dignity, for ensuring 
that people are never treated as commodities.157  
 
When egg donors and surrogates are perceived as 
commodities, this can lead to alienation from their bodies. 
This has to do with the fact that when reproductive labour 
is commoditized, we are taken further and further away 
from the natural. Naomi Pfeffer argued that for cisgender 
women undergoing IVF, the “mystique” of IVF conditions 
makes the task more external and less natural, and thus it 
 
154  See Jyotsna Agnihotri Gupta & Annemiek Richters, “Embodied 
Subjects and Fragmented Objects: Women’s Bodies, Assisted 
Reproduction Technologies and the Right to Self-Determination” 
(2008) 5:4 J Bioethical Inquiry 239; Janice G Raymond, Women as 
Wombs: Reproductive Technologies and the Battle over Women’s 
Freedom (North Melbourne: Spinifex Press, 1993); Vandana Shiva, 
Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development (London: Zed 
Books, 1988). 
155  See Raymond, supra note 154 at 203. 
156  See Anita L Allen, “Surrogacy, Slavery, and the Ownership of Life 
Property” (1990) 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 139 [Allen, “Surrogacy, 
Slavery”].  
157  See Thomas A Shannon, Surrogate Motherhood: The Ethics of Using 
Human Beings (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988) at 
157; Charis Thompson, “Why we should, in fact, pay for egg donation” 
(2007) 2:2 Regenerative Medicine 203. 
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becomes more alienating.158 The same could be said when 
egg donors’ and surrogates’ labour is commoditized. The 
tasks of producing eggs and child-bearing, when the labour 
is being performed under market conditions, could lead to 
donors’ and surrogates’ alienation from these forms of 
labour and from their bodies. Margaret Jane Radin argues 
that through feeling this separation or lack of identity with 
this form of labour, they will internalize the idea that they 
as persons are separate from these unique forms of labour 
they can perform.159 Cisgender women will experience the 
pain of the divided self.160 Radin additionally argues that 
even if cisgender women do not feel alienation from their 
bodies, there is a lot of social disapproval connected with 
commoditizing one’s body, and this in itself will 
exacerbate oppression, making egg donors and surrogates 
feel more alienated from society.161  
 
When egg donors’ and surrogates’ reproductive 
labour is seen as a commodity, there is also the possibility 
that they will be unduly influenced or coerced into selling 
this commodity. The argument is that cisgender women 
might be so lured by payment that they will not, or might 
be unable to, fully evaluate the risks of donating or acting 
as a surrogate, and thus the consent that they provide might 
 
158  See Naomi Pfeffer, The Stork and the Syringe: Political History of 
Reproductive Medicine (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). 
159  See Margaret Jane Radin, “Market-Inalienability” (1987) 100:8 Harv 
L Rev 1849 at 1916. 
160  See ibid.  
161  See ibid.  
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not be informed.162 Feminists such as Christine Overall 
have argued that this concern is amplified for young, single 
ethnic minority women of lower socioeconomic class.163 
Scholars, such as Anita Allen, have expressed concern that 
surrogacy and egg donation will become a new form of 
racial and class discrimination and that minority cisgender 
women will be specifically sought out to perform various 
types of reproductive labour for middle and upper-class 
intended parents.164  
 
There is a lack of research on the experiences of 
Canadian egg donors and surrogates. However, the body of 
scholarship on the experiences of surrogates and egg 
donors in other countries, that has been produced over the 
last few decades, has helped to shed light on whether these 
concerns (about surrogate and egg donors’ bodies being 
treated as though they are owned by intended parents and 
concerns related to their bodies being commoditized) are 
warranted. The literature on egg donation reports on the 
experience of donors in countries such as the United States, 
 
162  See Françoise Baylis & Carolyn McLeod, “The stem cell debate 
continues: The buying and selling of eggs for research” (2007) 33:12 
Journal of Medical Ethics 726; Martin Johnson, “Payments to gamete 
donors: position of the human fertilisation and embryology authority” 
(1997) 12:9 Human Reproduction 1839. 
163  See Christine Overall, Human Reproduction: Principles, Practices and 
Policies (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993); Diana Majury, 
“Pre-Conception Contracts: Giving the Mother an Option” in Simon 
Rosenblum & Peter Findlay, eds, Debating Canada’s Future: Views 
from the Left (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co, 1991) 197. 
164  See Allen, “Surrogacy, Slavery”, supra note 156. See also Barbara 
Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood:  Ideology and Technology in 
a Patriarchal Society (New York: Norton, 1989). 
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Canada, Finland, and the United Kingdom.165 This research 
found that egg donors ranged in age from twenty to thirty-
 
165  See Almeling, supra note 146; Hammond, supra note 153; Monica 
Konrad, Nameless Relations: Anonymity, Melanesia and Reproductive 
Gift Exchange between British Ova Donors and Recipients (New York: 
Berghan Books, 2005); Dorothy A Greenfeld et al, “Similarities and 
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Gail Geller, “A follow-up study with oocyte donors exploring their 
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experiences during their first donation cycle” (2010) 93:2 Fertility & 
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Fertility & Sterility 323; Susan Caruso Klock, Andrea Mechanik 
Braverman & Deidra Taylor Rausch, “Predicting anonymous egg 
donor satisfaction: A preliminary study” (1998) 7:2 J Women’s Health 
229; Sisan Caruso Klock, Jan Elman Stout & Marie Davidson, 
“Psychological characteristics and factors related to willingness to 
donate again among anonymous oocyte donors” (2003) 79 Fertil Steril 
1312; Steven R Lindheim, Jennie Chase & Mark V Sauer, “Assessing 
the influence of payment on motivations of women participating as 
oocyte donors” (2001) 52:2 Gynecologic & Obstetric Investigation 89; 
Matthew Patrick et al, “Anonymous oocyte donation: A follow-up 
questionnaire” (2001) 75:5 Fertility & Sterility 1034; Mark V Sauer & 
Richard J Paulson, “Oocyte donors: A demographic analysis of women 
at the University of Southern California” (1992) 7:5 Human 
Reproduction 726; LR Schover et al, “The psychological evaluation of 
oocyte donors” (1990) 11:4 Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 299; Viveca Söderström-Anttila, “Follow-up study of 
Finnish volunteer oocyte donors concerning their attitudes to oocyte 
donation” (1995) 10:11 Human Reproduction 3073; Alanna Winter & 
Judith C Daniluk, “A Gift From the Heart: The Experiences of Women 
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two, the majority are Caucasian, and a large number of 
donors are of a low socioeconomic status, with many of 
them being students.166  
 
However, as Rene Almeling indicates through the 
example of egg donor Megan, whilst money is a motivator, 
the money is not usually so much that it makes donating 
irresistible.167 In other words, the research on this topic 
indicates that egg donors do not, generally, seem unduly 
induced to donate. Egg donors’ overall description of egg 
donation is that it is quick and easy but there are a wide 
range of physical, psychological, and emotional risks 
involved with donation, many of which egg donors 
reported experiencing. For instance, egg donation raised 
personal dilemmas for egg donors surrounding the 
complicated set of relationships that result from 
donation—such as between egg donors, intended parents, 
and an offspring of the donation. Egg donors reported 
feeling sometimes as though they were just a “means to an 
 
Whose Egg Donations Helped Their Sisters Become Mothers” (2004) 
82:4 J Counseling & Development 483; Samantha Yee, Eric Blyth & 
A Ka Tat Tsang, “Oocyte donors’ experiences of altruistic known 
donation: a qualitative study” (2011) 29:4 J Reproductive & Infant 
Psychology 404; Samantha Yee, Jason A Hitkari & Ellen M 
Greenblatt, “A follow-up study of women who donated oocytes to 
known recipient couples for altruistic reasons” (2007) 22:7 Human 
Reproduction 2040. 
166  See e.g. Kenney & McGowan, supra note 165, which found that 45 
percent of their sample were students and 18.8 percent were 
unemployed. 
167  See Almeling, supra note 146 at 113. See also Hammond, supra note 
153.  
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end.”168 This, and research that shows that some donors, 
with particular backgrounds, are more sought out and/or 
more highly compensated than others supports the notion 
that egg donors might be treated as commodities, and 
reduced to their monetary value.169 Research that has 
looked at what exactly payment is for and the question of 
whether it is for egg donors’ labour, or for their bodies, has 
found that donors themselves seem to characterize 
payment as being for the process of donation—time 
injections, surgery, and/or risk, rather than for their 
bodies.170 
 
Karen Busby and Delaney Vun provide an 
excellent review of the empirical literature on surrogacy 
that was published at the time of writing the article.171 In 
their review, they observe that surrogates are often young 
(in their late twenties and early thirties) and Caucasian.172 
Overwhelmingly, most surrogates do not have regrets 
 
168  Hammond, supra note 153 at 117. 
169  See Aaron D Levine, “Self-regulation, compensation, and the ethical 
recruitment of oocyte donors” (2010) 40:2 Hastings Cent Rep 25. 
170  See Almeling, supra note 146 at 135; Erica Haimes, Ken Taylor & IIke 
Turkmendag, “Eggs, ethics and exploitation? Investigating women’s 
experiences of an egg sharing scheme” (2012) 34:8 Sociol Health 
Illness 1199. 
171  This literature was from the United States and Britain.  
172  See Karen Busby & Delaney Vun, “Revisiting ‘The Handmaid’s Tale’: 
Feminist Theory Meets Empirical Research on Surrogate Mothers 
Rethinking Assisted Conception” (2010) 26:1 Can J Fam L 13 at 42. 
Busby & Vun provide a terrific review of the empirical literature in 
Britain and the United States that has reported on the demographics 
and experiences of surrogate mothers. They do not, however, discuss 
the literature on surrogacy across borders.  
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about the process, they understand what they are agreeing 
to, and they have a satisfying relationship with the intended 
parents.173 A 2019 study, that was published after Busby 
and Vun’s article, collected data on the experiences of 184 
Canadian surrogates. It largely echoed these findings.174 
The study found that most women reported a positive 
experience, that relationships with intended parents played 
a large role in this overall rating, and that for the most part 
these were harmonious, or neutral. However, there were 
some situations where surrogates and intended parents had 
a conflictual relationship. For instance, “Surrogate 17” 
reported feeling as though, as soon as she was pregnant, “it 
was all about the baby.”175 Surrogate 38 found that the 
intended mother she worked with was too invasive.176 The 
comments of surrogate 17 reflect the concern of surrogates 
being reduced to a means to an end. Surrogate 38’s 
comment alludes to her possibly feeling alienated from her 
body, that was being invaded by the intended mother. The 
intended mother might also have been acting as though she 
had ownership over surrogate 38’s body. Thus, whilst the 
findings on surrogacy do not generally support concerns 
 
173  See ibid at 81. 
174  See Samantha Yee, Shilini Hemalal & Clifford L Librach, “‘Not my 
child to give away’: A qualitative analysis of gestational surrogates’ 
experiences” (2019) Women and Birth, DOI: 
<10.1016/j.wombi.2019.02.003>. This study is the most recent study 
on Canadian surrogacy and should be lauded for the large number of 
participants that the researchers were able to include. It is, however, 
important to note the possibility of a conflict of interest with this 
research given that it was conducted by fertility clinic staff (one of 
whom is a fertility clinic director).  
175  Ibid at 5.  
176  Ibid.  
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about surrogates feeling commoditized, being reduced to 
what they are exchanged for on the market, feeling 
alienated from their bodies, and/or feeling unduly 
influenced, there are some exceptions. There has been 
insufficient research on the experiences of Canadian 
surrogates to make an accurate assessment on just how 
many exceptions there are.  
 
The research that I have just recounted describes 
the experience of domestic egg donors and surrogates. 
There is also a transnational market in which Canadian 
intended parents are traveling abroad for paid surrogacy 
and egg donation and/or arranging for surrogates, egg 
donors and eggs to come to Canada. There is limited 
research on Canadians traveling abroad for surrogacy and 
egg donation, but the research that exists confirms that it is 
occurring.177 Concerns about egg donors and surrogates 
being commoditized has been particularly pronounced in 
the literature on cross-border reproductive care. Maneesha 
Deckha points out that this is because the experience of 
commodification is very different when egg donation and 
surrogacy is happening domestically versus 
transnationally.178 She goes on to argue that given how 
popular transnational surrogacy has become, we need to 
revisit earlier Westcentric feminist debates about 
 
177  See Blyth, supra note 153; Hughes & DeJean, supra note 153; Couture 
et al, supra note 153 for research on Canadians traveling abroad for 
egg donation. See Kristin Lozanski, “Transnational surrogacy: 
Canada’s contradictions” (2015) 124 Soc Sci Med 383 at 388–89 for 
research on Canadians traveling to India for gestational surrogacy. 
178  See Maneesha Deckha, “Situating Canada’s Commercial Surrogacy 
Ban in a Transnational Context: A Postcolonial Feminist Call for 
Legalization and Public Funding” (2015) 61:1 McGill LJ 31 at 35 
[Deckha, “Situating Canada”]. 
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commodification. They did not take into account 
transnational surrogacy and the phenomenon of intended 
parents traveling from the North to the global South for 
surrogacy. Given the transnational North–South nature of 
surrogacy, Deckha argues that we should employ a 
“postcolonial feminist perspective” to guide research and 
reform on surrogacy. When she speaks of a postcolonial 
feminist perspective, she is referring to a “theoretical 
framework that prioritizes the perspectives of women in the 
Global South,” and challenges Western analyses including 
those authored by Western feminists which “encode 
colonial assumptions about the lives of non-Western 
women and assume certain normative framings.”179 
Although Deckha is speaking here about gestational 
surrogacy, her arguments also apply to egg donation, as 
there is also a transnational egg donor market of oocytes 
between the North and Global South.180  
  
Research on transnational egg donation has 
observed that eggs are generally purchased in countries 
where the cost of eggs is lower—from “relatively 
 
179  See ibid at 54. Deckha observes, however, that even though it is 
important to take the vantage point of marginalized cisgender women, 
researchers need to be cognizant that the ability to take this vantage 
point will be limited by virtue of the fact that researchers are 
“privileged knowledge makers interpreting the experience of the 
Other.”  
180  See Catherine Waldby, “Oocyte markets: Women’s reproductive work 
in embryonic stem cell research” (2008) 27:1 New Genet Soc 19 at 22, 
which documents a number of egg markets that attract intended parents 
from abroad. 
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impoverished vendor populations.”181 This exacerbates 
concerns around the coercion and undue inducement of 
donors. Michal Nahman conducted ethnographic research 
on the experience of Romanian egg sellers. These egg 
sellers were engaging in what she terms “reverse 
trafficking.”182 Egg donors were going through the 
donation process at a private Israeli-owned clinic in 
Romania. The eggs were then fertilized at the clinic, and 
the embryos were imported to intended parents in Israel. 
Nahman illustrates how the egg sellers that she studies 
have to, and do, become “savvy participants (even 
entrepreneurs)” of the neoliberal economy.183 In an 
economy where citizenship, and thus worth, is equated 
with buying power, egg donors capitalize on their bodies 
(through selling their eggs), which enables them to 
participate in the market. Ultimately, Nahman argues that 
the reverse traffic nature of this process heightens 
inequalities among cisgender women who are situated 
differently globally. Since the egg donors’ eggs are just 
sent to the intended parents, the egg donor is invisible to 
 
181  Catherine Waldby & Melinda Cooper, “From reproductive work to 
regenerative labour: The female body and the stem cell industries” 
(2010) 11:1 Fem Theory 3 at 7. 
182  By “reverse traffic” Nahman is referring to the process of importing 
eggs into one country that come from donors in another country. This 
is becoming increasingly more common with improvements in the 
oocyte vitrification process. Eggs can be extracted in one country, 
frozen, and then shipped to intended parents in another country. See 
Michal Nahman, “Reverse traffic: intersecting inequalities in human 
egg donation” (2011) 23:5 Reproductive Biomedicine Online 626 at 
627. 
183  Michal Nahman, Extractions: An ethnography of reproductive tourism 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) at 54. 
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the intended parents. Her and her role are obfuscated.184 
This phenomenon might exacerbate concerns of cisgender 
women being commoditized, since the donors themselves 
are reduced to just being the source of the eggs.  
 
Concerns about cisgender women being 
commoditized are particularly high in the context of 
transnational gestational surrogacy. Scholars have 
remarked that it is the “bodies of poor brown women that 
now produce babies for rich (primarily) white women and 
men.”185 Research on cisgender women acting as 
surrogates for transnational couples has found that these 
women are aware of their life circumstances and are 
making choices that provide them with economic 
advancement and that are best for themselves and their 
families.186 There is agency in these choices to participate 
in this form of labour.187 Using the example of surrogacy 
in India, there are several aspects of the experience that 
make it seem as though women’s bodies are treated as 
 
184  See Nahman, supra note 182 at 632.  
185  Deckha, “Situating Canada”, supra note 178 at 35–36. India, in 
particular, has become a particularly popular destination for surrogacy. 
See Jyotsna A Gupta, “Reproductive biocrossings: Indian egg donors 
and surrogates in the globalized fertility market” (2015) 5:1 IJFAB 25, 
online: <utpjournals.press/doi/abs/10.3138/ijfab.5.1.25>.  
186  See Deckha, “Situating Canada”, supra note 178 at 59.  
187  See Katy Fulfer, “Commercial Contract Pregnancy in India, Judgment, 
and Resistance to Oppression” (2015) 30:4 Hypatia 846. Amrita Pande 
specifically describes surrogacy as labour in order to recognize these 
women as critical agents, and deconstruct the notion of victim, which 
is often used when discussing the bodies of third-world women. See 
also Amrita Pande, “Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a 
Perfect Mother‐Worker” (2010) 35:4 Signs 969 at 972.    
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though they are owned by intended parents, and/or that 
their bodies are being commoditized. Firstly, disparity in 
material conditions is what has made it such that there is an 
abundance of Southern surrogates for Northern parents.188 
Amrita Pande describes how many of the surrogates that 
she interviewed in India are poor, rural women.189 Fertility 
clinics take advantage of the socioeconomic vulnerability 
of these women, as well as their anxieties about being bad 
mothers (for instance, by not being able to provide for their 
children), in order to recruit them.190 
 
Secondly, surrogates often stay in a surrogacy 
hostel throughout the duration of the pregnancy, where 
they are separated from their families, have to eat certain 
food, and are limited in what they are allowed to do.191 The 
large number of restrictions on their freedom while they are 
pregnant give the impression that intended parents own 
their body while surrogates carry intended parents’ babies. 
They are told that they are just providing a home in their 
womb and that they are to care for the baby and love it more 
than their own—because it’s someone else’s. However, 
they also are told not to get too attached to the child, since 
this is only temporary. As Pande explains, a surrogate 
needs to be a nurturing mother while also recognizing their 
 
188  See Deckha, “Situating Canada”, supra note 178 at 56. 
189  See Pande, supra note 187 at 971, 974. Thirty-four of the forty-two 
surrogates that she interviewed had a family income below or around 
the poverty line in India.  
190  See ibid at 975.  
191  See ibid. Pande opens her article with a quote from an Indian surrogate 
describing her timetable at a surrogacy hostel. 
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disposability as a worker.192 Expectations such as these, 
that treat the pregnancy as external, might result in 
surrogates feeling alienated from their bodies. Thirdly, 
some surrogates are valued higher because of having 
certain characteristics like lighter skin. Lisa Ikemoto 
argues that there is also racial distancing that occurs 
between intended parents and surrogates. She remarks that 
the non-whiteness of the surrogate, and them being in a 
southern location distinguishes them racially from the 
commissioning couple.193 This might limit intended 
parents’ scope for empathy.194 This differential value that 
is placed on surrogates and distancing from them might 
lead to these women being reduced to a monetary value.  
 
A relational perspective of intended parents’ 
relationship with egg donors and surrogates, if embryos are 
treated as property, reveals that intended parents might be 
perceived as owning egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies. 
Even if egg donors’ and surrogates’ bodies are not 
perceived as being owned by intended parents, they might 
be reduced to commodities, especially when intended 
parents are paying for eggs or for the surrogacy. When egg 
donors and surrogates are perceived of as commodities this 
can result in them experiencing alienation from their 
reproductive capacities, being reduced to “means to an 
end,” and can involve them being coerced to sell their 
reproductive labour. The literature on domestic egg 
donation and surrogacy is largely positive and indicates 
 
192  See ibid at 978.  
193  See Lisa C Ikemoto, “Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the 
Global Market for Fertility Services” (2009) 27:2 Law & Ineq 277. 
194  See ibid.  
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that these concerns are not reflected in the lived 
experiences of donors and surrogates. However, at this 
point, there is insufficient research on the experiences of 
domestic Canadian egg donors and surrogates to make an 
accurate assessment. Existing research on transnational 
surrogacy and egg donation suggests that the interaction of 
gender, race, and class make concerns about ownership and 
commodification more pronounced for surrogates and egg 
donors in the Global South who are performing labour for 
intended parents traveling from the North.  
 
It is unclear to what extent treating embryos as 
property would feed into donors and surrogates being 
treated as owned, or commoditized. It is possible that 
embryos being categorized as property is too far removed 
from the egg donors, whose eggs are used to create them, 
and from the surrogates who might carry them. 
Alternatively, if the result of egg donors’ and intended 
parents’ efforts are treated as property that can be owned, 
this might exacerbate a belief that the women (donors and 
surrogates) who were paid to create these embryos, are 
ownable commodities. Rethinking property in the way 
suggested by Petchesky could be a way to ensure that self-
ownership no longer implies that women’s bodies then 








195  See Petchesky, supra note 51. 




Whilst I am not able to provide definitive answers on the 
ramifications to cisgender women of treating embryos as 
property, a feminist relational analysis reveals that 
categorizing embryos as property adds to an alarming 
power imbalance between cisgendered heterosexual 
intended parents in the context of disputes over embryos, 
and that categorizing embryos as property could perpetuate 
the idea that cisgender women’s bodies are ownable. 
Particularly in the context of transnational surrogacy and 
egg donation, categorizing embryos as property could 
create a domino effect whereby egg donors’ and 
surrogates’ bodies, which enable the creation of this 
“property,” are viewed as commodities. These findings are 
significant for a number of reasons. Firstly, at this point 
S.H. v D.H. is one of only a few cases in Canada on embryo 
disputes, and the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned the 
Superior Court’s decision which treated embryos as 
property. Thus, we have not had the chance to get a sense 
for what the full effects, for cisgender women, of 
categorizing embryos as property would be. This might 
soon change, since the number of individuals and couples 
creating and storing embryos in Canada is on the rise.196 
This will inevitably lead to more disputes that courts will 
 
196  The Canadian Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry provides 
yearly data on the use of these technologies in Canada. This data shows 
a constant yearly rise in the number of IVF cycles performed each year. 
See e.g. Better Outcomes Registry & Network Ontario, Canadian 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Register Plus (CARTR). 
Preliminary treatment cycle data for 2017 (Montreal, 2018), online 
(pdf): Canadian Fertility and Andrology Society 
<cfas.ca/_Library/cartr_annual_reports/CFAS-CARTR-Plus-
presentation-Sept-2018-FINAL-for-CFAS-website.pdf>. 
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be asked to resolve. If there are more disputes, where 
embryos are treated as property, this will mean that we 
might soon feel the negative effects to cisgender women in 
a bigger way. There might be no ramifications of this 
categorization. The ramifications might also be worse than 
I have predicted here. Second, if the ramifications of 
treating embryos as property are as I have predicted, then 
this will become one more way that women’s unique 
reproductive capacities, which should be appreciated and 
used to empower women, are in fact used to disempower 
women. In the same vein, this will become yet another way 
that the concept of property will intersect with gender, race, 
and class, and be used as a tool to oppress women, 
particularly racialized women.   
 
This research also highlights a number of issues for 
further thought and areas for future research. Firstly, it 
highlights areas where there are gaps, or insufficient 
amounts of research, in the existing literature. We need 
further research on how couples make decisions about 
dividing embryos in a dispute, on the experiences of 
Canadian egg donors and surrogates, and on the 
experiences of transnational egg donors and surrogates. 
Although it was beyond the scope of this paper, research is 
needed on how categorizing embryos as property might 
affect other relationships. In particular, it would be helpful 
to have research on the effects of categorizing embryos as 
property on the relationships between egg donors and 
children born through donated oocytes, and surrogates and 
children carried by a surrogate. Finally, this research 
suggests possible areas for law and policy reform. In the 
context of law and policy related to disputes over frozen 
embryos, one suggestion for law reform is that cisgender 
women should be given preference to use embryos where 
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a woman and her cisgender male partner are in a dispute.197 
More radically, this research points to flaws with our 
traditional definitions of property, and associated concepts 
of ownership and self-ownership. It suggests that perhaps 
the most prudent step is to rethink our outdated 

























197  See Carsley, “Rethinking Legal Responses”, supra note 30 at 109 for 
a whole list of recommendations of law reform in the context of 
embryo disposition disputes.  
198  Such as in the way proposed by Petchesky, supra note 51.  
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